Abstract-It is clear that humans have mental representations of their spatial environments and that these representations are useful, if not essential, in a wide variety of cognitive tasks such as identi cation of landmarks and objects, guiding actions and navigation and in directing spatial awareness and attention. Determining the properties of mental representation has long been a contentious issue (see Pinker, 1984). One method of probing the nature of human representation is by studying the extent to which representationcan surpass or go beyond the visual(or sensory) experience from which it derives. From a strictly empiricist standpoint what is not sensed cannot be represented; except as a combination of things that have been experienced. But perceptual experience is always limited by our view of the world and the properties of our visual system. It is therefore not surprising when human representationis found to be highly dependent on the initial viewpoint of the observer and on any shortcomings thereof. However, representationis not a static entity; it evolves with experience. The debate as to whether human representationof objects is view-dependent or view-invariant that has dominated research journals recently may simply be a discussion concerning how much information is available in the retinal image during experimental tests and whether this information is suf cient for the task at hand. Here we review an approach to the study of the development of human spatial representation under realistic problem solving scenarios. This is facilitated by the use of realistic virtual environments, exploratory learning and redundancy in visual detail.
INTRODUCTION
A mental representation is anything that allows us to think about, visualise and make judgements concerning physical objects or scenes in their absence. There seems little point in referring to mental representation without reference to the function that the representation subserves such as recognition. The forms of recognition that have been studied in experimental psychology include identi cation, categorisation and discrimination (see Liter and Bülthoff, 1998) . The basis for all these abilities is the encoding of spatial information derived through perceptual experience (Wallis and Bülthoff, 1999) . Spatial information derived during early vision is encoded and forms spatial memories of a region of space. Recognition is only successful if a mental representation can be matched with the current contents of perceptual experience. One requirement of this process is that it should be exible. This is desirable because the world around us is always changing and we should never expect to encounter exactly the same viewing condition on different occasions. A exible mental representation of objects or scenes must therefore be insensitive to variations in illumination, viewing conditions and other factors that may be liable to change on separate occasions. Such exibility may theoretically be achieved either by a transformation of the representation to match the contents of the perceptual encoding or by a transformation of perceptual encoding to match the representation. Thus, recognising a depth rotated object may be achieved either by transformation of an object in memory or by a transformation on the current contents of perceptual experience. Deciding which of these transformations is more prominent in human recognition (both are theoretically possible) is not easy and both entail problems. However, addressing such issues of exibility may provide us with a better understanding of how mental representation is achieved in humans. To do this it is informative to consider brie y the philosophical basis of the issue of mental representation.
Empiricist philosophers considered all knowledge to be ultimately derived from the basic sensory qualities of experience. John Locke for instance proposed the existence of both simple ideas (yellow, hot, sweet) and complex ideas (conjunctions of simple ideas). All knowledge therefore is based on experience and complex entities, or objects, are essentially combinations of qualities derived through sensory experience. The intention of John Locke and other empiricist philosophers who followed him was to determine the origin of ideas and therefore mental representation, the basis for knowledge. The in uence on this thinking is apparent in modern theories of vision. For instance, the conception of object representation as the result of hierarchical extraction of detail is embodied in David Marr's theory of object encoding. In Marr's view the nal (3D) encoding or representation of an object is a product of a so-called 2.5D sketch that only speci es the depth distances and orientation changes directly visible to the observer. Furthermore the 2.5D sketch is formed from a combination of even more basic detail derived from visual cues such as stereopsis, motion parallax, the kinetic depth effect, texture, shading, etc. (see Marr and Nishihara, 1978) . Different types of depth and shape information are extracted from each of these cues separately and combined to form the 2.5D sketch. Eventually, the 2.5D sketch is used to form a complete (3D) representation of an object.
In the last few years there have been numerous experiments carried out which delve into the information extraction modules proposed by Marr. The emphasis of this research has been either to produce a working model of each individual module (how it operates) or discovering how these modules interact or combine information to form a uni ed percept. At the same time, cognitive psychologists and neu-
